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What are the mechanisms by which groups with certain
opinions gain public voice and force others holding a
different view into silence? And how does social me-
dia play into this? Drawing on recent neuro-scientific
insights into the processing of social feedback, we de-
velop a theoretical model that allows to address these
questions. The model captures phenomena described
by spiral of silence theory of public opinion, provides
a mechanism-based foundation for it, and allows in
this way more general insight into how different group
structures relate to different regimes of collective opin-
ion expression. Even strong majorities can be forced
into silence if a minority acts as a cohesive whole. The
proposed framework of social feedback theory (SFT)
highlights the need for sociological theorising to un-
derstand the societal-level implications of findings in
social and cognitive neuroscience.
A better understanding of the collective processes underly-
ing public opinion expression is crucial for a better under-
standing of modern society. Sociological models drawing
on network science (1, 2, 3) and basic principles of hu-
man interaction behaviour (4, 5) have already provided
useful insight into collective phenomena related to mass
mobilisation (6, 7, 8), societal-level change of behaviour
(9,10,11) and beliefs (12). But for change to happen, for
a movement to gain pace, the alternative must be voiced
by a sufficiently large group (13). And to be voiced, it
must be perceived as something that can be said without
»fear of isolation« (14).
Spiral of silence theory (15) is based on this old »law of
opinion« (14, John Locke). It focusses on the collective
perception of what can be publicly voiced and hence im-
pact public opinion. Noelle-Neumann assumes that hu-
mans possess a »quasi-statistical organ« (16) to perceive
what can be said without being socially sanctioned. She
frequently refers to the »social nature of man« (17) to ex-
plain public opinion dynamics as a spiralling process in
which silence may lead to more silence. In this paper we
propose a mathematical model for this process based on
reinforcement learning (RL) by social feedback (18). In
repeated games played over a network, agents receive sig-
nals of approval or disapproval on expressing their opinion
to peers. They evolve an expectation about the social re-
ward obtained when expressing their opinion and remain
silent if they expect punishment (negative reward). RL
naturally captures the assumed »quasi-statistical« opinion
perception. Our paper develops a mechanism-based ap-
proach (5) that enables a more general application of the
assumptions underlying spiral of silence theory and allows
to relate structural variations across different groups to dif-
ferent regimes of collective opinion expression.
Moreover, we show that these modelling choices are well-
grounded in recent neuro-scientific insights into human
social nature. While the potential for explaining collec-
tive behaviour based on mechanisms identified in cog-
nitive and social neuroscience is frequently emphasized
(19, 20, 21), its integration with sociological theories of
collective opinion expression (15, 6, 7) is lacking. Social
Feedback Theory (SFT) bridges this gap by formulating
collective processes of opinion expression as a multi-agent
problem in which individual agents adapt according to
a reward- and value-based learning scheme identified in
neuro-scientific research (22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27). SFT pro-
vides a coherent framework for modelling collective opin-
ion processes that integrates recent neuro-scientific find-
ings, adaptive decision making (28) and political theory
of public opinion (15, 16). Such a theoretical framework
is essential for the analysis of societal-level implications of
social neuroscience.
Social neuroscience aims to identify neural mechanisms
involved into the processing of social cues. to understand
their functional role in social cognition. fMRI studies have
shed light on the interaction and interconnectedness of
different brain regions and their functional role in social
cognition. While it has long been controversial if human
nature evolved a neural circuity specifically for handling
social information or not (29, 30, 24, 20), it is now rela-
tively settled that a basic »reinforcement circuit« (23, 31)
is strongly involved into value-based decisions and learn-
ing from social feedback (32,33,34,35,36,37). Other brain
processes interfere with this circuity (23,20,38) especially
when social situations and tasks involve higher cognitive
functions such as trust (31), morality (39) or representa-
tions of self and the other (40,41).
Temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) (42,
43) has provided a useful computational account of the
brain mechanisms underlying social reward processing
and learning (24, 25, 26, 27). In TDRL, a new estimate
of the expected value Qt+1 associated to an action is a
function of the current estimate Qt and the temporal dif-
ference (TD) error δt between this estimate and the re-
ward that is actually obtained: Qt+1 = Qt + αδt. With
a rate governed by α (referred to as learning rate) this
scheme converges to a stable equilibrium in which the TD
error δt approaches zero such that expectations and ac-
tual reception of rewards are aligned (43). The usefulness
of TDRL in computational neuroscience derives from the
finding that the activity of dopaminergic neurons in the
midbrain regions is quantitatively related to the »reward-
prediction error« (20) between the experienced reward
and its expected value (22, 44, 45), that is, to δt. Social
neuroscience has provided ample evidence that such a ba-
sic reward processing circuit is also highly involved into
peer influence processes (34, 36), social conformity (33)
and approval (35).
Given that the processing of and learning by social feed-
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back is so deeply routed in the human brain, it is of utter-
most importance to better understand the collective con-
sequences of these processes. Especially in social media,
a tremendous number of quick feedback decisions is made
day by day by billions of users. »Like buttons« and quanti-
tative markers of collective endorsement can be associated
with low cognitive costs which suggests that a dominant
role is played by the fast value processing mechanisms ac-
counted for by TDRL. Recent studies have provided some
evidence for that (36,37). While it is reasonable to assume
that the social reward circuit has evolved to facilitate cohe-
sion and cooperation in small groups (20) with intensive
pairbonding (30), this reasoning may not apply for soci-
eties of increased complexity (46, 47). In complex social
networks, human ability to coordinate with in-groups may
come at the expense of an increasing alienation to out-
groups and therefore drive polarization dynamics (18).
Here we show that SFT of opinion expression provides a
neuro-biologically grounded explanation of collective pro-
cesses involved into »spirals of silence« (15) and related
phenomena of collective opinion expression.
We consider the situation that two groups with different
standpoints on a controversial issue have evolved and en-
gage in public discourse. Individuals within both opinion
groups can decide to express (E) their standpoint or to be
silent (S). They receive supportive feedback from their re-
spective in-group and negative feedback from agents in the
out-group when expressing their opinion. Individual inter-
action is hence formulated as repeated opinion expression
games with a reward system that captures approval and
disapproval by peers:
rti =
 −c silent neighbor−c+ 1 agreement−c− 1 disagreement (1)
The parameter c corresponds to a fixed cost of expression.
Having received a social feedback reward during an inter-
action, agents update the expected value Qi(A) of their
current action by TDRL
Qi(A)
t+1 = Qi(A)
t + α (rti −Qi(A)t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TD error
(2)
with learning rate α. As the reward of silence (S) is zero
in the game we only have to keep track of the value for
opinion expression and skip action indices in the sequel
(Qi(E) = Qi). Given the current value of opinion expres-
sion Qi an agent has learned in previous interactions, the
probability of opinion expression follows a softmax choice
model of the form
pi =
1
1 + e−βQi
(3)
in which β governs the rate of exploration. Taken together
the action selection (3) and the TDRL scheme (2) naturally
account for the effect that agents become more (less) will-
ing to speak out after receiving positive (negative) feed-
back.
Assume that we can characterise the two groups in terms
of their sizes (N1 and N2), their in-group cohesion and
inter-group connectivity. The probability of in-group in-
fluence is q11 for group 1, and q22 for group 2. Interac-
tion probability across groups is denoted by q12, q21 respec-
tively. We define the structural strength of group 1 and 2
(denoted as γ and δ) as
γ =
(N1 − 1)
N2
q11
q12
and δ =
(N2 − 1)
N1
q22
q21
. (4)
The structural strength of a group is determined by the
relative size of the group and the relative in-group connec-
tivity or cohesion (48,49). As γ and δ determine the prob-
ability of in-group versus out-group interaction (γ/(γ + 1)
versus 1/(γ+1) for group 1), they also govern the expected
rewards for opinion expression for individuals in the two
groups
E(r1) = p1
γ
γ + 1
− p2 1
γ + 1
− c, (5)
E(r2) = p2
δ
δ + 1
− p1 1
δ + 1
− c, (6)
where the probabilities for opinion expression p1, p2 are
given by (3). The Q-values are updated by Eq. (2) sub-
stituting the agent index i by the respective group index
and the reward with the expected rewards derived above.
As visible in Eq. (2), in TD learning the change of Q-
values from one time step to the other is given by the TD
error times the learning rate α. In the continuous time
limit (50, 51, 52), we describe the model dynamics by a
system of two differential equations
Q˙1 = E(r1)−Q1
Q˙2 = E(r2)−Q2. (7)
As the right hand side is zero when the Q-value estimate
is equal to the expected reward, the fixed points of (7) are
possible equilibria of the associated collective game.1
We apply this model to a minority-majority setting in
which one third of the population supports opinion 1 and
the other two thirds hold the majority view opinion 2.
The group size ratio (N2 − 1)/N1 approaches 2 for a large
number of agents. In the first scenario, the interaction
probabilities are homogeneous over the entire population
(q11 = q22 = q12 = q21 = q). This corresponds to the
Erdo˝s-Rényi random graph (54,55) with link probability q
and represents a situation without any particular organisa-
tion of social relations within and in between both camps.
The structural strength indicators (4) are then determined
by the relative group sizes: γ = 1/2 and δ = 2. The only
fixed point of system (7) corresponds to majority expres-
sion and a silent minority (see Figure 1, l.h.s.). Even if
expressive in the beginning, agents in the minority find
less and less public support for their opinion and in turn
increasingly avoid to express their opinion in public.
The minority can gain public impact if the internal orga-
nization of the group becomes more cohesive. The effect
of this structural transition towards stronger minority or-
ganisation is shown in Figure 1 and 2. As the probability
q11 of in-group connection increases the system undergoes
1See (53) for a game theoretic analysis of the model and further de-
tails on the mean field approach.
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Figure 1: Two groups supporting two different opinions struggle for public expression. The majority group (blue) is twice as big as
the minority group (red). The three different situations represent subsequent increases of internal cohesion of the minority group
and the respective phase dynamics of the system. The isoclines of the dynamics system are shown and the stable fixed points at their
intersection are highlighted. While minority expression is unstable in an unstructured random graph, the minority can compensate
their quantitative inferiority by a stronger internal organisation. Results for an exploration rate β = 8. Random Graph (left): ER
graph with link probability 0.05. For group sizes N1 = 100 and N2 = 200 each agent has 15 links on average. The minority is
connected to 5 agents of the in-group and to 10 agents of the out-group. Vice versa for the majority leading to structural strength
indicators γ = 0.5 and δ = 2. The resulting system has only one stable fixed point at Q1 ≈ −0.33 and Q2 ≈ 0.66 with associated
expression rates of p1 ≈ 0.067 and p2 ≈ 0.995. That is, only the majority group is expressive and the minority silent. Cohesive
Minority (centre): Increasing internal organisation of the minority group by raising the connection probability within the minority
to 0.2. This increased group cohesion is reflected in an increased structural strength γ = 2. δ is not affected. The system becomes
symmetric and minority (red circle) or majority group expression (blue circle) are solutions reached depending on the initial values
of expression. An additional fixed point (green circle) emerges in which two groups are loud. Strongly Cohesive Minority (right):
The in-group cohesion of the minority further increases leading to γ = 4 and δ = 2. The case that only the majority is in expression
mode is no longer stable and the minority will always express its opinion. Co-existence is still possible.
a series of saddle-node bifurcations. First, a small increase
of q11 (and hence γ) gives rise to an additional stable fixed
point in which only the minority is expressive (not shown).
Minority and majority compete for public voice. As the
internal connectivity of the minority group increases to
q11 = 4q the situation becomes symmetric with γ = δ = 2.
In other words, the minority can compensate quantitative
inferiority by a more cohesive internal organisation. Both
groups can readily express their opinion if the other group
is silent (competition, Figure 1, centre). But also an ad-
ditional stable fixed point in which both opinions coexist
appeared through another saddle-node bifurcation (coex-
istence). Finally, if the internal cohesion of the minority
group becomes very large (q11 = 7q), the fixed point as-
sociated to a loud majority and silent minority disappears.
That is, the minority always voices their view in public
while the majority may become silent (see Figure 1, r.h.s.).
In the model, agents observe and react to their social envi-
ronment in a way that is strongly reminiscent of Noelle-
Neumann’s theory of the spiral of silence (15, 16, 17).
In repeated interaction within their local neighbourhood,
agents form a »quasi-statistical« impression of the cur-
rent opinion climate in terms of an internalized expecta-
tion (Q-values) of which opinion is prevalent in their pub-
lic spheres and whether their opinion can be articulated
without being sanctioned. If their opinion corresponds to
the perceived majority view, they become more willing to
speak out. If they perceive themselves to hold the minority
view, they become less willing to do so. If all agents adapt
to the current opinion landscape in this way, minorities are
forced into a spiralling process in which silence leads to
more silence. However, only if the minority is perceived as
minority in both groups. Bifurcation analysis of our model
shows (see Figure 2) that also majorities can be forced into
silence if a minority acts as a cohesive whole. Even a slight
increase of homophily with respect to minority interaction
can lead to a situation where a loud minority dominates
public discourse because the majority is silent. Individuals
with the actual majority opinion learn that voicing their
view in public is rarely answered by support and is more
often challenged by an expressive minority. Silence of the
majority group is then collectively reinforced because each
individual member is worse off by opinion expression.
Spiral of silence theory emerged as an attempt to explain a
series of »last minute swings« during German elections in
the sixties and seventies (16). Termed »bandwagon effect«
this phenomena had already been observed by Lazarsfeld
and colleagues in the 1940 US presidential elections (56).
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Figure 2: Bifurcation plot of the scenario in which a minor-
ity (N1/N2 = 1/2) gains public voice through stronger internal
organisation (see also Figure 1). On the r.h.s. the expression
rate (3) is shown as a function of Q for β = 8. As the inter-
nal cohesion of the minority group increases, for instance, due to
strategic linking or tying group symbols, the system undergoes a
series of saddle-node bifurcations. Minority expression becomes
more and more likely. Solid lines show the Q-values at the sta-
ble fixed points. For equilibria in which only one group is loud
blue lines represent the majority group Q2, red lines the minor-
ity Q1. Green lines correspond to the coexistence equilibrium in
which both groups are expressive. While an unorganised minor-
ity is forced into silence (blue regime), a slight increase in group
cohesion makes minority expression a stable outcome if the ma-
jority is silent (competition, yellow). At a certain point (q11 = 4q
and γ = δ = 2) minority organisation can compensate numerical
inferiority and stable coexistence of two expressive groups is pos-
sible. By further increase of minority group strength, it is always
visible in public while the majority may enter a spiral of silence.
While surveyed voting intentions where head-to-head be-
tween the two major parties until the very last days of
the campaigning period, Noelle-Neumann observed that
the evolution of expectations about who will win the elec-
tion showed a clear trend towards the final winner during
month before the election day. Developing a series of re-
fined survey instruments, she showed that differences in
the willingness to publicly support a party are one source
of these trends. Our model captures this dynamical feed-
back between internalized expectations of majority and
willingness to actively speak out for one’s party and sug-
gests that the situation of election campaigns at that time
is characterised by the competitive regime in Figure 2
and 3. Our research shows that the collective process de-
scribed by Noelle Neumann — that is, the spiral of silence
— is only one possible outcome of the mircoassumptions
on which the theory builds. The bifurcation analysis of the
dynamical system (7) reveals how structural transforma-
tions of group interaction may lead to qualitatively differ-
ent regimes of collective opinion expression.
Today, social media are rapidly transforming the landscape
of public opinion expression providing niches for virtu-
ally every opinion. As social network services have flex-
ibilized options to connect with like-minded others or to
gather under common tags (such as #FridaysForFuture
and #MeToo) – and hence to learn that there are others
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Figure 3: Bifurcation plot of the scenario in which two groups
of equal size become more structured around the opinion they
support. An increase of homophily for both opinion groups is
captured by increasing γ and δ at the same time. The situation is
symmetric and only Q1 is shown. After a phase of competition if
homophily is low (yellow), coexistence emerges as a fixed point
(violet) and becomes the only solution after a further slight in-
crease of homophily (green). Both groups express their opinion
within their own niches.
who share a similar view –, previously unseen opportuni-
ties to escape the »fear of isolation« have grown. Group
interaction that is more and more structured around opin-
ion is captured by the transition shown in Figure 3. As in-
group ties become more prevalent in both groups, the sys-
tem undergoes two saddle node bifurcations from a com-
petitive regime to a regime where coexistence is the only
stable outcome. Private or semi-public rooms for express-
ing opinion online act as »echo chambers« and enable that
opinions previously marginalized or placed under taboo –
including those advanced by »populist alternatives« – may
resist the spiral of silence and become salient in the more
general public discourse. This alters the public percep-
tion of what can be said in public. Democratic societies
currently struggle with this transformed climate of opin-
ions because the foundational idea of government build
on public opinion (57,58) is fundamentally challenged.
SFT aims to contribute to a better understanding of
societal-level implications our social nature. It provides
a link between recent research on the neurological basis
of social behaviour and sociological theory of public opin-
ion formation and expression. The model presented in this
paper involves abstractions and assumptions at three dif-
ferent analytical levels (see Figure 4) each being subject to
intensive research from different disciplinary angles. Pro-
viding a coherent theoretical account that integrates soci-
ological modes of structural explanation (3, 5), adaptive
decision theory (28, 42) and its underlying neurological
mechanisms (59, 60), SFT offers a unique framework for
guiding future research in sociology, decision science and
neurobiology.
At the collective level (top row), SFT relates structural
transformations in how we interact with one another to
different regimes of collective opinion expression. The
main modelling assumption made at this level is to map
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Figure 4: Schematic summary of social feedback theory of opinion expression. The theory involves three analytical levels
from the level of neuro-cognitive processes, to the level of social interaction, to the macro level of collective dynamics.
SFT bridges these levels through the notion of opinion games: first, by assuming that agent behavior and the associated
expected rewards adapt according to a reinforcement learning scheme that resembles the reward processing system in
the brain; and second, by showing that agents following this scheme for learning how to act in repeated opinion games
leads to collective dynamics as described by spiral of silence theory.
complex networks of social interaction to the relations
within and across groups. Network science has brought
about a portfolio of graph models to more realistically cap-
ture social interaction patterns (61,48,1,62) to which the
model but not necessarily its formulation as a 2D system of
differential equations can be applied. On the other hand,
our theory suggests that social feedback networks gener-
ated on the basis of digital trace data (63) are inherently
biased by the activity of users who learnt that interac-
tion on the media is rewarding. In fact, our model sug-
gests that retrieved interaction patterns such as retweet
networks (64, 65, 66) may render a situation more polar-
ized than it actually is because public expression is less re-
warding for actors who maintain relations across different
opinion camps.
The micro level of social interaction (second row) is con-
ceived as repeated opinion expression games in which
agents respond to one another with signals of approval or
disapproval. This entails simplifications such as dyadic in-
teraction and a reward system that is homogeneous across
individuals and groups. However, by drawing on games
in modelling individual interaction, SFT is well-equipped
to take into account individual differences in reward per-
ception as well as characteristics of the incentive struc-
ture of different platforms. It shifts the explanatory fo-
cus from forms of social influence to the rewards and in-
centives of opinion expression in different social settings
(18). Opinion games are also flexible enough to include
cognitive costs associated to, for instance, preference fal-
sification (7, 67). Seen from the perspective of opinion
games, agents rely on TDRL to »solve« the associated col-
lective game (42, 68, 53). This enables the application of
game theoretic concepts in model analysis (49, 69). How-
ever, as social neuroscience unequivocally demonstrates,
the bounded and procedural account of rationality (28)
implemented by TDRL does not necessarily involve con-
scious calculation.
The social feedback framework draws on this neuro-
cognitive foundation of TDRL (bottom row). In order
to demonstrate that biologically-rooted mechanisms of re-
ward and value processing capture collective processes de-
scribed in spiral of silence theory, we rely on the most
simple TDRL scheme in the model. Social neuroscience
is quickly advancing towards a better understanding how
brain areas related to cognitive control interfere with this
basic reward circuit. Recent work revealed, for instance,
that neural responses to social feedback are influenced by
the social relation with the interaction partner (70) and
that the reward valuation circuit is highly involved in shap-
ing these relations (71). Experimental designs that mimic
interaction on social media (36, 37) could clarify the role
of different reward systems and target which kinds of in-
teraction devices activate cognitive control. In this way,
social neuroscience could significantly contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the types of games that are actually
played in social media environments.
Considerable progress has been made in social neuro-
science in shedding light on human social nature. Bio-
logical evolution has shaped a reward processing architec-
ture that is highly involved in social interaction on opin-
ions. Social feedback theory allows to address the collec-
tive implications that may result from this involvement.
Basal brain mechanisms governing our reactions to social
approval and disapproval may have a tremendous impact
on collective processes of opinion expression and may be
at the root of phenomena such as silent majorities. Social
media facilitates massive and strategic social organisation
around opinions. This can, as we show, fundamentally al-
ter the perception of public opinion in a society.
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